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ABSTRACT
Although most disputes between groups of people are settled peacefully, sometimes disputes
result in war. This lecture uses historical examples to illustrate how the ability to negotiate a credible
peaceful settlement of a dispute between sovereign states, typically a dispute over the control of
territory or natural resources, depends on the divisibility of the outcome of the dispute, on the
effectiveness of the fortifications and counterattacks with which an attacker would expect to have
to contend, and on the permanence of the outcome of a potential war.  The lecture also contrasts the







herschel_grossman@brown.eduSince Adam and Eve were expelled from the Garden of Eden, the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse have wrecked their havoc on mankind. Although the meaning of the metaphor of
the Four Horsemen remains subject to ongoing scholarly controversies, we can take the Four
Horsemen to represent famine, disease, natural disasters, and the subject of this lecture,
war.1
In modern times science and technology have mitigated the ravages of three of the
Four Horsemen. Improvements in agriculture and in transportation have helped to alle-
viate famine and to feed growing populations, medical science and public health have made
steady progress in ﬁnding and eﬀecting preventions and cures for diseases, and advances in
structural and civil engineering have resulted in better protection from natural disasters.
War, however, continues to be both an acute problem and a puzzle. I call war a puzzle
because, this horseman being wholly man made, we might think that it would be easy to
relieve ourselves of his torments. But, despite our achievements in science and technology,
and in profound humanistic thinking, we have not made noticeable progress in solving the
problem of war. A comparison of modern times with what we know about human history
suggests that wars, both wars between sovereign states and civil wars, are as common now
as they ever have been.
People sometimes attempt to explain the persistence of war by claiming that wars are an
inevitable consequence of “human nature”. There are both scientiﬁc and religious versions
1These controversies involve biblical exegesis and the interpretation of medieval iconography, The prox-
imate source of the metaphor of the Four Horsemen is the New Testament Book of Revelation. Earlier
sources include the Old Testament Books of Ezekiel and Zechariah. The Four Horsemen have often been
popularized, perhaps most famously by the artist Albrecht D¨ urer in his brilliant woodcut of 1498 and by
the sports writer Grantland Rice, who used the metaphor, with slightly diﬀerent names for the Horsemen,
to romanticize the 1924 University of Notre Dame football team.
Outlined against a blue-gray October sky, the Four Horsemen rode again. In dramatic lore,
they are known as famine, pestilence, destruction and death. These are only aliases. Their real
names are Stuhldreher, Miller, Crowley and Layden.
1of this claim. A scientiﬁc version is that evolution has hardwired into us a proclivity for
groups of people to ﬁght with other groups of people. According to this theory we will see
an end to war only if future evolutionary developments bring about a salutary change in
human nature.
A religious version of the claim that war results inevitably from human nature is that
people, or at least some people, are innately sinful and unable to eschew violence. According
to this theory an end to war must await the coming of a messianic age in which divine
intervention will change human nature.
Disputes, Peaceful Settlements, and Wars
Whether based on science or religion the claim that human nature makes war inevitable
overlooks a critical observation:
Disputes between groups of people, and an accompanying potential for war, are
ubiquitous, but the use of war to settle disputes, although it happens painfully
often, is not ubiquitous.
B e c a u s ep e o p l ea r em a t e r i a l i s t i ca n da c q u i s itive, and also can have strong views about
ideological issues, groups of people have disputes about all manner of things. Disputes
between sovereign states, as well as disputes about secession, in which a group wants to
break away and to create a new sovereign state, typically involve the control of territory and
natural resources. In contrast, disputes between factions within a sovereign state – that is,
between groups that are part of the same polity – typically involve either the distribution
of political power and income or religion and other ideological issues.
The important fact, however, is that, regardless of their nature, most disputes between
groups of people are settled peacefully. Only a small fraction of disputes between sovereign
states result in inter-state war, and only a small fraction of disputes between constituent
groups of a polity result in civil war. Even disputes about secession are often settled peace-
fully and only sometimes result in wars of independence.
2The fact that most disputes are settled peacefully belies the claim that war is an inevitable
consequence of human nature. This fact also directs us to the central question:
Although human nature apparently does not preclude the peaceful settlement of
disputes, why do some disputes result in war?
As a social scientist I presume that this question aﬀords a general set of answers. That
is to say, I presume that wars are not wholly idiosyncratic. In addition, to address this
question I presume that war is instrumental, by which I mean that war is a means that
groups sometimes choose to employ in attempting to settle a dispute favorably.
War, however, is a problematical instrument for settling a dispute, because war is costly
and risky. When groups arm, they incur the cost of mobilizing resources that have alternative
productive uses. In addition, war causes havoc in the form of destruction, suﬀering, and
death. War also involves risks, which include the possibility that either the cost of mobilizing
resources or the resulting havoc will turn out to be larger than expected, the fear of each
member of a group that he (or she) will incur a disproportionately large share of the cost or
the havoc, and the fear of each group that it might lose the war.
Although war is costly and risky, taking the groups involved in a dispute together, war
cannot provide any compensating gain, because the outcome of a dispute can be more favor-
able to one group only if it is less favorable to the other group. Accordingly, it is natural to
conjecture that every dispute aﬀords a peaceful settlement that avoids war. Moreover, we
should not be surprised that groups usually settle their disputes peacefully, sometimes by
one group conceding to the demands of the other, but more often by reaching a compromise
in which both groups gain something without incurring the costs of mobilizing resources,
without suﬀering the havoc of war, and without bearing the risks of war. But, then we
come back to the earlier question: Why aren’t all disputes settled peacefully? Given the
presumption that war is instrumental, an answer to this question requires an understanding
of how groups choose between peace and war in settling disputes.
3The Oregon Treaty and the Mexican-American War
To begin let us focus on territorial disputes between sovereign states, starting with an
example that is close to home.2 In the 1840s two territorial disputes, one between the United
States and Great Britain and the other between the United States and Mexico, permanently
shaped the political map of North America.3 T h eD e m o c r a t i cc a n d i d a t e ,J a m e sP o l k ,w o n
the American presidential election of 1844 on a platform that asserted the American claim
to the entire Oregon territory, including the part that later became British Columbia. The
political slogan “Fifty-four Forty or Fight!”, a reference to 54 degrees 40 minutes north
latitude, dramatized this claim.4
But, the outcome of this territorial dispute was neither ﬁfty-four forty nor ﬁght. In the
Oregon Treaty of 1846 the United States and Great Britain peacefully settled the dispute by
2See Herschel Grossman (2003c) for a formalization of the analysis of territoral disputes that follows.
This analysis assumes that, as in the dispute between the United States and Great Britain over the Oregon
territory, the preferences of the inhabitants of the contested territory play no role. In a complementary
analysis Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore (1997, 2003, 2004) assume that preferences for public goods,
including collective security, determine the incorporation of regions into sovereign states. The analysis that
follows also assumes that states act in the territorial disputes as if they are unitary agents and, hence,
that their internal politics do not bear on these disputes. Examples of recent literature on the relation
between politics and war include Michelle Garﬁnkel (1994) and Gregory Hess and Athanasios Orphanides
(1995, 2001). Finally, the analysis that follows assumes that neither state is a Stackelberg leader, who could
make an irreversible choice to arm before the other state arms. The analyses in Grossman and Minseong
Kim (1995), Dmitriy Gershenson and Grossman (2000), and Grossman and Juan Mendoza (2002), suggest
conditions under which a Stackelberg leader would choose to spend enough on arms to cause the other state
to give up its claim to the contested territory.
3David Pletcher (1973) provides an extensive account of political, diplomatic, and military developments
in these simultaneous territorial disputes.
4The origin of the slogan is obscure. Both Edwin Miles (1957) and Hans Sperber (1957) conclude that,
contrary to some accounts, it was not used during the election campaign of 1844, but originated during the
congressional debates that followed the election.
4dividing the Oregon territory between the United States and Canada. The Oregon Treaty
also conceded a British demand for rights of navigation on the Columbia River, although
the Columbia River turned out not to be usefully navigable anyhow.
In the decades following the Oregon Treaty the United States and Great Britain peacefully
settled additional territorial disputes that arose over the San Juan Islands, rights to hunt
fur seals, and the boundary of Alaska. These settlements completed the demarcation of the
current border between the United States and Canada.
In sharp contrast to the peaceful settlement of the dispute over the Oregon territory, in
the same year, 1846, territorial disputes between the United States and Mexico led to war,
with disastrous consequences for Mexico. As the result of the Mexican-American War the
United States annexed previously Mexican territories that now comprise Arizona, California,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and parts of Colorado and Texas.
These historical accounts leave us with the following question: What was importantly
diﬀerent about the territorial disputes between the United States and Great Britain and be-
tween the United States and Mexico that allowed the United States and Great Britain, like
most sovereign states that have territorial disputes, to reach a peaceful settlement, whereas
the United States and Mexico went to war?
As a schoolboy I learned with pride that the United States and Canada enjoyed the
world’s longest unfortiﬁed border between sovereign states. In addition, my elders led me to
believe that this happy state of aﬀairs resulted from the moral superiority of Americans and
Canadians, especially in contrast to Mexicans and also to Europeans, who, being greedy and
quarrelsome, regularly fought wasteful and destructive wars, the Second World War that
had just ended being the latest example.
If we wish to, we can believe that we are morally superior. But, a theory of the choice
between peace and war oﬀe r sl e s si n v i d i o u se x p l a n a t i o n sf o rd i ﬀerences in the ways in which
disputes between sovereign states have been resolved. What are these explanations?
5Armed Peace
In the months preceeding the signing of the Oregon Treaty the British fortiﬁed Vancouver
Island and sent the British Paciﬁc Squadron to patrol the Oregon coast, while the United
States government sent army units to Oregon ostensibly to protect arriving American settlers.
More importantly, the Americans alerted their fortiﬁcations on the Atlantic coast to the
possibility that the British would press their claim to the Oregon territory by blockading
and bombarding American coastal cities as the British had done in the War of 1812. At the
same time the British increased their fortiﬁc a t i o n sa r o u n dt h eG r e a tL a k e sf o rf e a rt h a tt h e
Americans would press their claim to the Oregon territory by again invading Ontario and
the St. Lawrence Valley.
Thus, while the United States and Great Britain were negotiating a peaceful settlement
of their dispute over the Oregon territory, they also were arming and preparing for the
possibility of war. In this respect the Oregon Treaty was a typical peaceful settlement
of a territorial dispute between sovereign states in that it was initially an armed peace.
Although the settling of territorial disputes peacefully is common, and even routine, peaceful
settlements of territorial disputes rarely call for the resulting border to be unfortiﬁed.5
The idea that fortiﬁcations can make a peaceful settlement of a territorial dispute possible
is embodied in the popular observation, “Good fences make good neighbors.” More generally
the possibility of arming for peace is embodied in an ancient prescription: Qui desiderat
pacem, preparet bellum.6
But, even if war is avoided, fortifying a border is costly. Accordingly, just as it is
5In this context we deﬁne fortiﬁcations to include not only defensive positions such as those on Vancouver
Island, or like the Maginot Line and the Seigfried Line, that were literally on the border, but also to include
all costly preparations for the possibility of war over a contested territory, such as the repositioning of British
warships oﬀ the Atlantic coast of the United States in anticipation of a war over the Oregon territory.
6The theory of armed peace derives from the seminal work of Garﬁnkel (1990) and Robert Powell (1993)
on the strategic role of arms.
6natural to conjecture that, because war is costly and risky, every territorial dispute aﬀords a
peaceful settlement, it is also natural to conjecture that every territorial dispute also aﬀords
a settlement that includes an agreement not to fortify the resulting border. Moreover, as we
know, the United States and Canada eventually supplemented the Oregon Treaty with an
implicit understanding not to fortify the border between United States and Canada.
These observations present us with another pair of questions to answer:
Although sovereign states settle most of their territorial disputes peacefully, why
don’t most peaceful settlements include agreements not to fortify the resulting
border, and why have the United States and Canada been an exception?
Credibility
The key to answering each of the questions that I have raised is to recognize that a
peaceful settlement has to be credible.7 We can state this requirement more precisely as
follows:
States can successfully negotiate a peaceful settlement that divides a contested
territory between them only if each state can credibly promise not to start a war
in an attempt to gain control of more territory.
What criterion do negotiators use to assess the credibility of a promise not to start a war?
A state would think that another state’s promise not to start a war is credible
only if the other state would be better oﬀ by keeping its promise not to start a
war than by breaking its promise.
7The discussion that follows draws heavily on the comprehensive analysis of the causes of war by James
Fearon (1995). Fearon begins by asking about the existence of a “bargaining range”, which would comprise
“a set of negotiated settlements that both sides prefer to ﬁghting”. Later on he asks about the credibility of
such negotiated settlements. In contrast, because the set of credible peaceful settlements is a subset of the
bargaining range, I prefer to cut to the chase by analyzing credibility at the start.
7Unfortunately, this criterion presents the following dilemma:
Each state would be better oﬀ keeping its promise not to start a war if a peaceful
settlement would give it a large share of the contested territory. But, a peaceful
settlement can give one state a large share of the contested territory only by giving
the other state a small share.
The essential question for negotiators is whether they can divide the contested territory in
such a way that each state gets a large enough share to induce it to keep its promise not to
start a war.
Negotiators also would recognize that a state would be more tempted to break its promise
not to start a war
• if it puts a high value on control of the entire contested territory and
• if it attaches a high probability to its winning a war that it starts.
In addition negotiators would recognize that the probability that a state attaches to its
winning a war that it starts would depend on the strength of the defenses and possible
counterattacks with which as an attacker it would expect to have to contend.
This analysis would enable realistic negotiators to address the following questions about
hypothetical peaceful settlements that divide the contested territory:
• Is it possible to divide a contested territory in such a way that with an unfortiﬁed
border promises not to start a war would be credible?
• If not, would a fortiﬁed border make such promises credible?
The preceding discussion suggests that the answers to these questions depend on two
critical factors:
• the divisibility of the contested territory: Is the whole of a contested territory more
valuable than the sum of its parts?
8• the advantage to attacking: Would a state that starts a war have to contend with a
substantial counterattack?
Let us now look more carefully at these critical factors.
Divisibility
In a peaceful settlement of a territorial dispute the states typically divide the contested
territory. But, in some cases the whole of a contested territory is more valuable than the
sum of its parts, making division of the territory costly. If the winner of a war would gain
control of the entire territory, and if the whole of a contested territory is suﬃciently more
valuable than the sum of its parts, then, despite the costs and risks of war, promises not to
s t a r taw a rc o u l db en o tc r e d i b l e ,a n dap e a c e f u ls e t t l e m e n t ,o ra tl e a s tap e a c e f u ls e t t l e m e n t
with unfortiﬁed borders, would not be possible.
As an example of a contested territory being costly to divide, the value of natural re-
sources in the interior of the territory, like furs in the Oregon territory, can depend on their
being easily transported to a seaport on the territory’s coast for shipment abroad. In this
example, which accords with the strong aversion that sovereign states have to being land-
locked, control of the interior of the territory alone has little value. Fortunately, in the
Oregon Treaty of 1846 the United States and Great Britain were able to minimize the costs
of dividing the territory and to solve a perceived problem of access to the sea by giving the
British rights of navigation on the Columbia River.
This example also bears on the American Civil War, the bloodiest war ever fought in
North America. According to some historians one of the causes of the War was that the
Union could not accept the existence of an independent Southern Confederacy that would
have controlled access to the sea via the Mississippi River.
Existential Disputes
The dispute over the Oregon territory did not concern the survival of the either United
States or Great Britain as sovereign states or even, as it might have, the issue of whether the
9United States would tolerate a British presence in North America. In this sense the dispute
was not existential. Had the dispute been existential it probably would not have aﬀorded
the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
To see the diﬀerence between nonexistential and existential disputes contrast the First
and Second Punic Wars with the Third Punic War. In the First Punic War (264-241 BCE)
and also in the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE) Rome and Carthage fought over control
of some Mediterranean islands and Iberia. Neither Rome nor Carthage was attempting to
conquer and to destroy the other. Hence, their territorial disputes apparently aﬀorded the
possibility of peaceful settlements involving division of the contested territories. It seems
that Rome and Carthage did not reach peaceful settlements only because the Carthaginians
were overly optimistic about their prospects of winning these wars.
In contrast, in the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE) the Roman objective was to gain
a commercial monopoly in the Mediterranean Sea. To achieve this objective the Romans
recognized that, as Cato the Censor chanted, “Carthage must be destroyed” or, at least,
subjugated. In this dispute the issue was existential, and the outcome was indivisible. Either
R o m ew o u l do rw o u l dn o tc o n q u e rC a r t h a g e .
Perhaps the most common examples of existential disputes with indivisible outcomes
are disputes about secession, such as the disputes that resulted in the American War of
Independence and the American Civil War, more accurately called the War for Southern
Independence. The ongoing dispute between Arabs and Israelis provides a similar example.
Over the years the Arabs have rejected every proposal for a peaceful settlement that would
divide Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, because for the Arabs allowing a
Jewish state would be a defeat, not a compromise. The Israelis, however, demand a Jewish
state, and they refuse to turn all of Palestine into a single multinational state in which Jews
would not make up a large majority of the population.
If the dispute between Arabs and Israelis were about the control of tracts of land or
10sources of water, then a peaceful settlement might have been possible long ago. But, the
dispute is about the existence of a Jewish state, and the outcome is indivisible. Is there or
is there not to be a Jewish state in Palestine? The answer is either yes or no.
Side Payments
I ns o m ec a s e se i t h e rs i d ep a y m e n t so rl i n k a g e sa m o n gi s s u e sc a ng e ta r o u n dt h ep r o b l e m s
of costly division or indivisibility. The idea of a side payment is that one state concedes
to the demands of the other state with regard to the dispute at hand, thereby avoiding a
costly division of the contested territory, in exchange for monetary or other compensation.
This possibility requires that at least one of the states has the resources to provide adequate
compensation to the other state.
The related idea of a linkage among issues is that one state concedes to the demands
of the other state in one set of disputes, in exchange for which the other state concedes in
another set of disputes between these states. This possibility requires that the two states
have simultaneous disputes that they can combine into sets of comparable importance.
It seems clear that in many historical cases side payments or linkages among issues were
not feasible. For example, once the Romans had set their sights on a commercial monopoly
in the Mediterranean Sea, there was no possibility that the Carthaginians could pay the
Romans enough to dissuade the Romans from trying to subjugate or to destroy Carthage.
Similarly, there seems to be no possibility that the Arabs could pay the Israelis enough to
persuade the Israelis to give up their goal of a Jewish state in Palestine.8
Counterattacks
An unfortiﬁed or lightly fortiﬁed border creates a temptation for an opponent to attack
– that is, to start a war by striking ﬁrst. But, if, in response to an attack, a state would
8Fearon (1995) argues on the basis of some examples that either side payments or linkages “typically” are
feasible. Hence, he concludes that indivisibility does not provide a “compelling” reason for failure to settle
a dispute peacefully.
11be able to mobilize resources to mount an eﬀective counterattack, then an attacker would
expect to have to contend with more than a defender’s fortiﬁcations, and the temptation to
attack would be mitigated.
The ability of a state to mount an eﬀective counterattack depends on variety of factors,
including geography, technology, and military organization. The important point is that the
prospect of an eﬀective counterattack would deter a state from breaking a promise not to
start a war and could make such a promise credible. For example, although the primary
mission of the British Atlantic ﬂeet did not involve the dispute over the Oregon territory,
the possibility that the Admiralty could move the ﬂeet into position to threaten the Atlantic
coast of the United States surely helped to make the Oregon Treaty possible. The strength
of the Atlantic ﬂeet also enabled the British to spend less on directly fortifying the border
between the United States and Canada.
Overoptimism
I have speculated that Rome and Carthage did not reach peaceful settlements that would
have avoided the First and Second Punic Wars because the Carthaginians were overly op-
timistic about their prospects of winning these wars. Overoptimism is most likely to result
from underestimation of attributes that would enable an opponent to wage war successfully,
such as the eﬀectives of an opponent’s military forces, the willingness of an opponent to incur
the costs of war and to bear the risks of war, and the ability of an opponent to mobilize re-
sources to mount an eﬀective counterattack. Whatever its cause overoptimism can preclude
a peaceful settlement, or it can mean that a peaceful settlement requires more fortiﬁcations.9
It is easy to underestimate an opponent because many of an opponent’s attributes are
9Dagobert Brito and Michael Intriligator (1985) provide a seminal analysis of how overoptimism can
prevent a peaceful settlement of a dispute. In their example overoptimism results from underestimation of
the importance of a dispute to an opponent. Fearon (1995) also emphasizes the importance of overoptimism
as a cause of war. A similar analysis would apply if the states underestimate the costs of war.
12likely to be the opponent’s private information, or at least to be best known to the opponent
itself.10 In addition, to enhance its bargaining strength in negotiations for a peaceful
settlement each state has an incentive to make exaggerated claims about its ability to wage
war successfully. But, recognizing this incentive to dissemble each state will discount any
claims made by its opponent, unless it can independently verify that these claims are true.
If a state is unable to verify the claims made by an opponent, then its estimation of this
opponent has to be based on imperfect intelligence, the main source of which is likely to be
the performance of this opponent in previous wars. But, suppose that this opponent has
achieved recent improvements in its ability to wage war successfully, with these improvements
reﬂecting underlying innovations in weaponry or in military tactics. If this opponent has
not yet demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of these innovations, and especially if a desire to
maximize the eﬀectiveness of these innovations deters the opponent from revealing too much
about them, then intelligence is likely to provide an outdated assessment that would result
in overestimation of the probability of winning a war against this opponent.
Historically, overoptimism about the prospects of winning a war seems often to have been
a factor both in preventing peaceful settlements of new disputes and also in causing existing
peaceful settlements of old disputes to break down. Prior to the Mexican-American War the
Mexicans rejected American proposals to adjust the border peacefully apparently because,
having observed the recent poor performance of the American army in the Second Seminole
War, and not being aware that the Americans had since shaped up their army, the Mexicans
underestimated the ability of the American army. Other apparent examples of overoptimism
from the modern history of warfare include the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War (1904),
the Central Powers in the First World War (1914), the Axis Powers in the Second World
War (1939), the North Koreans in the Korean War (1951), the Americans in the Vietnam
10It is also possible, but less likely, for the leaders of a s t a t et ob eo v e r l yo p t i m i s t i cb e c a u s et h e yo v e r e s t i -
mate either the eﬀectiveness of their own military forces or their own willingness to incur the costs and to
bear the risks of war.
13War (1964), the Argentines in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War (1982), and the Iraqis in
the Iraq War (2003).11 In contrast to these examples in 1846 the Americans and the British
each apparently knew enough about the ability the other to wage war successfully to be able
to settle the dispute over the Oregon territory peacefully.
Although overoptimism about the prospects of winning a war can cause a dispute to
result in war, the experience of war can cure overoptimism and, thereby, can provide the
basis for peaceful settlements of both old disputes and newly arising disputes. For example,
the lessons learned from the Mexican-American War induced the Mexicans not only to agree
to every immediate American territorial demand in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848,
but also to agree to further American territorial demands in the Gadsden Purchase of 1853.
Sometimes a third party learns important lessons from war. For example, according to
some historians, the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, by demonstrating that United
States had this weapon and was willing to use it, helped to prevent the Soviet Union from
being overly optimistic about winning a war with the United States, and thereby helped to
prevent a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly, some historians
attribute the American military interventions in Korea and in Vietnam in part to a desire
to demonstrate that the United States was willing to incur the costs of war in order to con-
tain “international communism”. According to Iwan Morgan (1995, page 30), “[President]
Johnson told Congress in 1965: ‘The aim [of the communists] in Viet-Nam is not simply
the conquest of the South...It is to show that the American commitment is worthless. Once
that is done, the gates are down and the road is open to expansion and endless conquest.”’
As Fearon (1995, page 400) puts it, “States employ war itself as a costly signal of privately
known and otherwise unveriﬁable information about willingness to ﬁght...[and] as a credible
11Fearon (1995) explains how in the Russo-Japanese War outdated Russian intelligence underestimated
the eﬀectiveness of the Japanese military forces and how in the First World War the Central Powers under-
estimated the willingness of the Allies to incur the costs of war. The Axis Powers apparently repeated this
mistake in the Second World War.
14means to reveal private information about their military capabilities.”
Sometimes, however, overoptimism can be persistent. The endemic warfare between
Arabs and Israelis provides a pathological example. Arab rhetoric equates the Zionist project
of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine to the creation of a colony. As long as the Arabs
believe their own argument that Zionism is an instance of colonialism, the lessons that the
Arabs glean from past conﬂicts between colonial settlers and indigenous peoples are relevant
to prospects for peace between Arabs and Israelis. The problem is that the Arabs seem to
be overly optimistic in taking examples such as Algeria and South Africa, where colonialism
ultimately failed, to be models for their conﬂict with Zionism. An end to warfare between
Arabs and Israelis seems unlikely not only because, as already pointed out, the Arabs are
unwilling to accept a Jewish state in Palestine, but also because the Arabs believe that they
do not have to accept a Jewish state in Palestine.
Surprise Attacks
In September 1938 at Munich Great Britain and France reached an agreement with
Germany that conceded Hitler’s demand to annex the Sudetenland to Germany. When
Chamberlain and Daladier negotiated this agreement, apparently they thought that Hitler’s
promise not to attempt to gain control of more territory was credible. As William Shirer
(1960, page 387) tells us, “...the Prime Minister [Chamberlain] had great conﬁdence in the
Fuehrer’s word, remarking privately ..., ‘In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought
Is a wi n[ H i t l e r ’ s ]f a c e ,Ig o tt h ei m p r e s s i o nt h a th e r ew a sam a nw h oc o u l db er e l i e du p o n
when he had given his word.’”
Less than a year later von Ribbentrop and Molotov negotiated the German-Soviet Nonag-
gression Pact. This Pact and its various secret protocols divided control of Poland and the
Baltic states between Germany and the Soviet Union. When Stalin agreed to this Pact,
which was signed in his presence, Stalin, like Chamberlain and Daladier before him, also
apparently thought that a promise by Hitler not to attempt to gain control of more territory
15was credible. According to Gerhard Weinberg (1994, pages 162, 165-6), early in 1940 the
British ambassador to Moscow reported that “Stalin professed to see no danger threaten-
ing the Soviet Union from Germany,” and as late as the winter of 1941 Soviet planning
discounted the possibility of a German invasion.
In both cases Hitler broke his promises. Within months Germany abrogated the Munich
agreement by seizing control of the rest of Czechoslovakia. Presumably Chamberlain and
Daladier were surprised. Hitler had confounded what Shirer refers to as Chamberlain’s
“comforting illusions” that the Munich agreements had achieved “peace in our time”.
In June 1941 Germany abrogated the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact by launching
Operation Barbarossa, an invasion of the Soviet Union. By every indication Stalin certainly
was surprised. In hindsight Chamberlain and Daladier in 1938 and Stalin in 1939 were wrong
to think that they had achieved peaceful settlements of German territorial demands.
After Hitler surprised the British and the French and subsequently surprised Stalin, it
was Hitler’s turn to be surprised. By September 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, the
British and French could no longer have thought that a peaceful settlement with German was
possible. But, apparently Hitler was surprised that Great Britain and France were unwilling
to acquiesce in further German aggression in the East and declared war on Germany. A.J.P.
Taylor (1961, page 70) tells us, “Against all expectations, Hitler found himself at war with
the Western Powers before he had conquered the East.”12
Later, in launching the Battle of Britain Hitler seems to have underestimated both the
eﬀectiveness of the Royal Air Force and the willingness of the British to incur the costs of an
intense and protracted war. British innovations in weaponry, most importantly radar and
12Whether Hitler had ultimate territorial ambitions in western Europe is not clear. Taylor (1961, page 70)
argues that “eastern expansion was the primary purpose of [Hitler’s] policy, if not the only one.” But, other
historians suggest that the Nazis intended all along to incorporate western Europe into their empire. See,
for example, Weinberg (1994, page 107). Grossman and Mendoza (2002) analyze the strategies that Nazi
Germany used in central and eastern Europe to build its short-lived empire.
16the Spitﬁre interceptor, as well as the resilience of the British surprised the Germans. Shirer
(1960, page 776) tells us that, a c c o r d i n gt ot h et e s t i m o n yo fA d o l fG a l l a n d ,t h ef a m o u s
German ﬁghter ace, “We [Germans] realized that the R.A.F. ﬁghter squadrons must be
controlled from the ground by some new procedure because we heard commands skillfully
and accurately directing Spitﬁres and Hurricanes on to German formations...For us this radar
and ﬁghter control was a surprise and a very bitter one.” Shirer (1960, pages 760-761) also
tells us that after Dunkirk General Jodl, the head of the German armed forces operations
staﬀ, expressed the belief that “since England can no longer ﬁght for victory, but only for the
preservation of its possessions and its world prestige she should, according to all predictions,
be inclined to make peace when she learns that she can still get it now at relatively little
cost.” Shirer continues, “This was what Hitler thought too and he immediately set to work
on his peace speech for the Reichstag.”
Similarly, in launching Operation Barbarossa Hitler expected a quick and easy defeat of
the Soviet Union, but he fatally underestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to mobilize
massive amounts of manpower and resources in response to an attack. Horst Boog (1998,
page 221) tells us that “... the decision to attack the Soviet Union failed to give rise to
any appropriate eﬀorts in the armaments sector. At no time was a maximum eﬀort even
considered – an eﬀort commensurate with the enemy’s potential – because the German
leadership assumed that available forces were suﬃcient to smash the Soviet military potential
within a few weeks.” And, according to Weinberg (1994, page 273), “The Germans had no
real concept of the rate at which the Soviet Union had been mobilizing new forces to introduce
into the battle, and they were so far oﬀ in their view of Soviet power as to assert early in
December [1941] that the Red Army had neither the ability nor the intention of launching
any signiﬁcant counter-oﬀense of its own.” The Soviet counterattack at Stalingrad was the
ultimate surprise for Hitler.
The criterion that negotiators would use to assess the credibility of a promise not to
17start a war suggests that the critical failing of Chamberlain, Daladier, and Stalin was not to
recognize the extent of Hitler’s overoptimism about the prospects for German success in war.
Had Chamberlain, Daladier, and Stalin known the extent to which Hitler underestimated the
strength of the defenses and counterattacks, both British and Soviet, with which Germany
would have to contend, it is unlikely that they would have assessed Hitler’s promises not to
start a war in an attempt to gain control of more territory to be credible.
I have previously suggested that German overoptimism about the prospects for German
success in war was one of the causes of the Second World War. But, why did the prelude
to this war include the negotiation of what Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union
thought incorrectly were peaceful settlements? The answer to this question seems to be that
the British, French, and Soviet negotiators did not appreciate how overly optimistic Hitler
was about how easy it would be for German military power to conquer Europe.
Does War Settle a Dispute Permanently?
A peaceful settlement with a fortiﬁed border typically involves both an initial cost of
creating the required fortiﬁcations and continually recurring expenses, such as for salaries
of soldiers and for maintenence of weapons and fortiﬁcations. If a state thinks, even if over
optimistically, that a war would settle a territorial dispute permanently, then it would be
tempted to start a war in order to avoid these recurring expenses. If deterring an attack
would require large recurring expenses, then a war that would settle a dispute permanently
could appear to be less costly than a peaceful settlement.13
A related possibility arises if one state thinks that the other state is improving its ability
to wage war successfully and that, consequently, in the future the other state will be able
to demand a large share of the contested territory. In this case a state would be tempted
to start a war now in order to avoid having to deal with a stronger opponent in the future.
Some historians suggest that a perception that Russian military power was increasing was a
13See Garﬁnkel and Stergios Skaperdas (2000) for further analysis of this possibility.
18factor in inducing Germany and Austria to go to war in 1914.14
Alternatively, if a war would not settle a territorial dispute permanently, then whatever
advantage a state that attacks an unfortiﬁed border would get in determining the outcome of
the dispute would be only temporary. In addition, by breaking a promise not to start a war
as t a t ew o u l dm a k ei td i ﬃcult, if not impossible, to negotiate a new peaceful settlement in
the future. The prospect of having to incur the costs and to bear the risks of war indeﬁnitely
into the future would mitigate the temptation to start a war and could make promises not
t os t a r taw a rc r e d i b l e . 15
Territorial Disputes: Summary
For more than a century the borders between the United States and Canada have been
both undisputed and unfortiﬁed. The United States and Canada not only have avoided war
but we also have avoided the potentially large costs of fortifying their border. Why have not
all sovereign states that have territorial disputes emulated us?
Our theory of the choice between peace and war implies that, despite the costs and risks
of war, if a dispute is existential, or, more generally, if the whole of a contested territory
is suﬃciently more valuable than the sum of its parts, then a peaceful settlement is not
possible. A peaceful settlement of a territorial dispute, and especially a settlement that
includes an agreement not to fortify the resulting border, also can be impossible if a state
thinks, even if over optimistically, that by starting a war it would be able at a small cost to
settle the dispute completely in its favor permanently.
Conversely, our theory implies that the following circumstances help to make a peaceful
settlement of a territorial dispute possible:
14Fearon (1995) discusses at some length this possibility, which he calls a “preventive war”, as well as its
relevance to the First World War.
15Grossman (2003a) argues that this analysis helps to explain the peaceful settlement of the dispute over
the Oregon territory.
19• Either dividing the contested territory is not costly or side payments can make it
possible to avoid a costly division of a contested territory.
• A state that started a war by striking ﬁrst would have to contend with a substantial
counterattack.
• Aw a rw o u l dnot settle the territorial dispute permanently, and the breaking of a
promise not to start a war would make it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to negotiate a
new peaceful settlement in the future.
History suggests that all of these circumstances contributed to the peaceful settlement of
the dispute over the Oregon territory as well as to the subsequent understanding that the
border between the United States and Canada would be unfortiﬁed.
Our theory also allows for the possibility that in some cases a peaceful settlement can
require the resulting border to be fortiﬁed, because it is too tempting for one state to start
a war if the other state has not fortiﬁed the border. With a fortiﬁed border fortiﬁcations
deter each state from breaking a promise not to start a war.
Civil Wars
So far we have focused on territorial disputes between sovereign states. But, disputes
between groups that are part of the same polity are at least as ubiquitous as disputes between
sovereign states, and civil wars are at least as common as wars between sovereign states.16
The constituent groups of a polity that are involved in disputes can be either narrow,
like rival ruling elites or rival political cliques, or broad, like clans, ethnic groups, or social
classes. The disputes that arise between these groups can involve a single issue or, more
16In some cases these classiﬁcations are ambiguous. For example, the parties to a dispute about secession
are initially part of the same polity, but, if a dispute about secession results in a war of independence, then
the parties to the war are self-proclaimed sovereign states.
20likely, a sequence of diﬀerent, although possibly related, issues. Examples of issues that can
cause recurring disputes between constituent groups of a polity include the following:
• A political squabble: the share of political patronage that goes to the politicians asso-
ciated with one clique rather than another.
• A divisive distributional issue: the share of national income that goes to one social
class rather than another.
• A divisive ideological issue: the degree of tolerance for the religious practices of one
ethnic group, these practices being oﬀensive to another ethnic group.
The possibilities for peaceful settlements of disputes between constituent groups of a
polity diﬀer from the possibilities for peaceful settlements of disputes between sovereign
states in at least two important ways:
• First, an armed peace involving constituent groups of the same polity is not possible,
unless the polity is dissolved by secession.
• Second, a peaceful settlement of recurring disputes between constituent groups of the
same polity does not have to specify the outcome of each dispute, but instead can
specify a constitution that prescribes a peaceful political process for determining the
outcomes of disputes.
Actual constitutional political processes vary widely. In electoral democracies constitu-
tional contests involve periodic competition for the votes of an electorate. In contrast, in
aristocracies constitutional contests involve competition for the favor of wise men, elders,
or hereditary rulers. Many constitutions combine democratic and aristocratic features. For
example, under the Constitution of the UnitedS t a t e si n1 8 7 6a n da g a i ni n2 0 0 0i n c o n c l u -
sive electoral competitions led to second competitions in which the candidates for President
competed for the favor of a Supreme Court of appointed judges.
21In any case the political process prescribed by any constitution includes two essential
components:
• ﬁrst, the nature of constitutional contests between parties to disputes;
• second, the prerogatives of winners of these constitutional contests.
In addition, any constitution must overcome a formidable hurdle if it is to provide a
viable alternative to civil war:
Because the constituent groups of a polity cannot make binding commitments to
abide by a constitution, a constitutional political process provides a viable alter-
native to civil war only if the parties voluntarily choose to accept the outcome of
this political process – that is, only if the constitution is self enforcing.
What are the factors that determine whether or not it possible to design a self-enforcing
constitution that can settle recurring disputes between constituent groups of a polity? Both
theoretical analysis and historical experience suggest the same answer to this question:17
A self-enforcing constitution is possible only if the constituent groups of a polity
expect the incremental costs of civil conﬂict to be large relative to the importance
of the disputes that arise between them.
Conversely, as long as the expected incremental costs of civil war are not too large, consti-
tutional political processes cannot settle important disputes.
The American Civil War provides an interesting example. For the ﬁrst seventy years of
the republic artful compromises enabled Northern and Southern interests to ﬁnd peaceful
settlements of their disputes, which centered on slavery. But, historical analysis suggests
that in the years leading up to 1861 the outcome of the dispute over slavery became too
17The relevant theoretical analysis is developed in Grossman (2003d, 2004).
22important to both Northern and Southern interests, relative to the expected costs and the
risks of war, for secession and war to be avoided. In the end Northern interests would not
agree not to impose restrictions on the property rights of slave owners that Southern interests
viewed to be intolerable.18 In sum, if the constituent groups of a polity are deeply divided
and, hence, are unwilling to accept meaningful limitations on the prerogatives of winners of
constitutional contests, then civil war can be unavoidable.
18See Grossman (2003b) for an extended analysis of the causes of secession and war.
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